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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ohio is in the midst of a potential economic boom. The recent interest in 
developing the Utica and Marcellus shale formations has already caused 
millions of dollars to be invested in the state, and there is potential for even 
more. The discovery and utilization of the shale formations in Ohio could help 
ease our nation’s energy dependence and initiate the state’s ability to produce 
new revenue streams capable of developing multiple tiers of employment and 
wealth creation in one of the frailest economies in recent memory. This 
potential for growth is cast against the backdrop of Ohio’s limited amount of oil 
and gas jurisprudence. Although Ohio has been home to oil and gas production 
for more than 150 years, its jurisprudence is relatively sparse compared to large 
oil and gas producing states such as Oklahoma and Texas. One area of 
particular concern to companies entering the Utica play is the validity of old 
leases that are held by production. This Article analyzes the limited Ohio law on 
the issue of gaps or “missing” production history of oil and gas leases that are 
outside of their primary term and considers the treatment of this issue in other 
states. 
A typical lease for oil and gas has a primary term of one to ten years and a 
secondary term that perpetuates the lease “as long thereafter as”1 oil or gas is 
produced in paying quantities. There are many leases in Ohio that are still valid 
and being operated under their secondary term. Most of these leases involve 
wells that are producing from the Clinton shale formation or other traditional 
shallow formations. Producers are now purchasing assignments of the deep gas 
rights associated with these leases with the intent of developing the Utica 
formation. Issues arise, however, when landowners or other interested parties 
contend that these old leases are no longer held by production due to missing or 
inconsistent production data during the secondary term.  
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Ohio courts are already seeing an increase in litigation as landowners 
attempt to invalidate old leases in order to sign new leases for large bonus 
payments and increased royalties. Current operators vigorously defend these 
suits in order to continue production and to protect their ability to assign the 
Utica rights to large producers. The Supreme Court of Ohio has provided very 
limited guidance on a challenge of the validity of an oil and gas lease for lack of 
production. Thus, this area of Ohio law is left to the lower courts, which have 
provided conflicting guidance on the continued validity of various lease forms 
under different fact situations. A clearly defined rule is essential for Ohio’s 
development of oil and gas and to provide comprehensible guidelines for not 
only producers, but also landowners. 
II. OHIO LAW 
As noted hereinabove, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not provided specific 
guidance on this issue, but it has held that Ohio law clearly abhors forfeiture.2 It 
has also held that oil and gas leases are contracts and the terms of the contract 
will govern the rights and remedies of the parties.3 The court has not ruled, 
however, on the exact nature of an oil and gas lease. Is it a fee simple 
determinable which would automatically revert to the lessor upon the violation 
of any condition in the lease, or is an oil and gas lease a fee simple subject to a 
condition subsequent which would not automatically terminate the lease but 
give the lessor the right to terminate it? Or is it some form of a mere mining 
lease? Whether the lease language creates a fee simple determinable, afee 
simple subject to condition subsequent or a true mining lease means the 
difference between a lease that is automatically terminated, and a lease that 
requires action.4 Absent express terms in the oil and gas lease to address the 
specifics of the secondary term, the average producer and landowner are left to 
wonder about the validity of their lease and what action is necessary to 
terminate the lease. 
Ohio’s Eleventh Appellate District Court held that “[t]he terminology 
utilized in the habendum clause (“and as long thereafter as”) is generally 
construed to create a determinable fee interest, such that the lessee’s interest 
automatically terminates upon lessee’s failure to satisfy any of the listed 
provisions which would serve to extend the term of the lease.”5 According to 
the court, no action by either the lessor or lessee was necessary to terminate the 
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lease; it had expired on its own terms.6 The Ninth Appellate District also views 
an oil and gas lease as a fee simple determinable.7  
Other Ohio courts, however, have not based their reasoning on the nature of 
an oil and gas lease but have analyzed other factors in determining the validity 
of leases in their secondary term. In deciding whether to terminate a lease for 
cessation of operations resulting in zero production, courts generally consider 
the following key factors: (1) the duration of time over which there was no 
production; (2) the cause of the cessation; and (3) the lessee’s diligence in 
restoring production.8 Yet, Ohio courts have provided little certainty as to 
specifically how much missing production for which reasons and under what 
circumstances is required to find a lease terminable.   
It is well established that a mere temporary cessation in production will not 
be enough to forfeit a lease.9 The Fourth Appellate District has opined that 
courts should look at the length of time the well is out of production, and 
consider all attendant circumstances.10 In Wagner v. Smith, the lease at issue 
was “held” by a well that had not produced for a period of more than two 
years.11 The Wagner court noted that a two-year lapse of production was more 
than a temporary cessation and that the other defenses the operator raised were 
not sufficient to justify the cessation.12 Thus, a court determining whether 
cessation was “temporary” to keep a lease active would likely look at all the 
circumstances, including the length of delay and reason for delay in determining 
under Ohio law whether the lease was forfeited.  
Ohio courts have not adopted a clear-cut rule as to what is an acceptable 
cause of cessation. In Wagner, the court rejected the lessee’s cause of cessation, 
which was that there were difficulties in repairing the problem of a leaking well 
and in determining the most efficient way to contact and obtain agreements 
from minority interest owners.13 An Ohio court determining the cause of 
cessation would likely look at the obstacle that stands in the way of production 
and whether the cause is a reason to stop production.  
Ohio has also required that the lessee operate with due diligence in restoring 
the production of the well when there has been a gap in activity. A totality of 
the circumstances approach was taken in Wagner to determine that the lessee 
did not exercise due diligence in restoring the production.14 To arrive at its 
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decision, the court reviewed the “circumstances of the non-production, the 
cause of the non-production, and the length of time of non-production.”15 These 
guidelines analyze the cause of and total time of non-production as factors to 
determine whether there was due diligence in restoring the well to production 
status.  
Arguments will likely be made that if a landowner is currently accepting 
royalty payments under a lease, the lease is ratified and still a valid lease. In 
Litton v. Geisler, the Fourth Appellate District Court noted that, “[i]t is rather 
universally held that acceptance of rents or royalties under an oil and gas lease 
such as the one here under consideration is a waiver of forfeiture for breach of 
any covenant or condition for which such rents or royalties are paid.”16 
However, in Bonner Farms Ltd. v. Fritz, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit rejected this argument in its analysis of Ohio law.17 In that 
case, it was argued that the landowners’ acceptance of royalty payments ratified 
a lease that had not been producing. The court disagreed and held that the 
landowner was already entitled to payment from mineral interest that he owned 
and therefore his actions did not constitute ratification. The court stated that 
“before a party is estopped by the receipt of benefits from a transaction to deny 
the validity of the transaction it must initially appear that he is not otherwise 
entitled to those benefits.”18 If the landowner accepted free gas or rental 
payments under the lease, the estoppel claim would have been valid.  
The issue of forfeiture of leases also must be viewed in light of implied 
covenants contained within oil and gas leases. Discussion of implied covenants 
is not the purpose of this article, but it should be noted that the Supreme Court 
of Ohio has two important cases on the issue of forfeiture. In Harris v. Ohio Oil 
Co., the court held that the breach of an implied covenant in an oil and gas lease 
could not cause a forfeiture of the lease, but rather resulted in an action for 
damages.19 Further, the court held with “[s]ome causes of forfeiture being 
expressly mentioned, none other can be implied.”20 In Beer v. Griffith, the Ohio 
Supreme Court cited Harris, but held in certain circumstances that parts of a 
lease could be forfeited for breach of an implied covenant.21 In Ionno v. Glen-
Gery Corp., the Supreme Court of Ohio attempted to clarify Beer by noting the 
Beer decision does not stand for the proposition that forfeiture can never be 
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imposed, but that forfeiture can only be imposed when necessary to grant justice 
to both parties.22 Forfeiture is also referred to as an “extreme measure.”23  
Thus, Ohio courts have not provided clear guidance to assist producers or 
landowners in determining whether their leases are still valid. As evidenced 
above, the lower courts are split as to exactly when a lease terminates for lack 
of production and exactly when, or if, forfeiture occurs.  
III. OTHER STATES’ LAWS 
Other states, such as Texas and Oklahoma, have solidified these rules by 
addressing the issue of the nature of an oil and gas lease. In order to better 
understand what position Ohio should adopt, a brief background on Texas and 
Oklahoma oil and gas jurisprudence is necessary.  
Texas law views oil and gas leases that contain a habendum clause that 
reads “operations shall continue for so long as oil and gas is produced in paying 
quantities” as creating a fee simple determinable estate.24 Texas shares Ohio’s 
jurisprudential abhorrence of forfeitures but refuses to class a termination of an 
oil and gas lease upon the happening of the trigger event for the determination 
of the leased estate as a “forfeiture.” Texas bases its reasoning on the view that 
oil and gas leases are granted for a specific use of land, in this case the 
removing of hydrocarbons beneath the surface, and by the language of the lease 
indicating that it ends when it is no longer utilized for that specific use.25 
Essentially, Texas treats an oil and gas lease as a sale of the oil and gas 
underlying the property, which is subject to a reverter upon the happening of an 
event, usually the cessation of oil and gas production.26 Texas views the 
termination of a lease when the trigger event specified in the habendum clause 
as the simple expiration of the lease in accord with its terms, not a forfeiture.   
Oklahoma adheres to a completely different interpretation of the nature of 
an oil and gas lease.27 Oklahoma rejects the Texas interpretation, reasoning that 
the grantee under a fee simple determinable conveyance stands in a dissimilar 
position from that of the lessee under an oil and gas lease.28 The court in 
Fransen v. Eckhardt stated: 
Under a lease, development by the lessee is intended, and it is understood that 
the lessee will have the power to try to extend the lease by production, in a [fee 
simple determinable], the parties do not contemplate activity by the grantee to 
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produce the minerals for the mutual benefit of the grantee and the 
reversioner.29 
This means that the parties in an oil and gas lease intend to enter a mutually 
beneficial relationship. The lessor has an interest to see the lessee use all means 
in which to extract the oil and gas so that the lessor may receive a larger 
proportional share of the sale. Also, the lessee has an interest in selling as much 
oil and gas produced in order to generate income for itself. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court has reasoned that the “grantor of a [fee simple determinable] 
interest does not think of any benefit but [its] own.”30 Therefore, forfeitures are 
not automatic under Oklahoma’s interpretation.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The law adopted in Oklahoma would best serve the interest of Ohio. Unlike 
Texas, Oklahoma avoids forfeiture of the lease when possible. “Forfeiture is a 
deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the nonperformance of 
some obligation or condition . . . [E]quity abhors a forfeiture.”31 Subsequently, 
Oklahoma has also ruled that not only equity, but “[t]he law abhors a 
forfeiture.”32 Unless the parties have contemplated an agreement that expressly 
provides conditions for forfeiture, the law should avoid this remedy at all cost. 
Forfeiture does not provide stability in the law. The Texas fee simple 
determinable approach to oil and gas leases adopted by some of Ohio’s lower 
courts results in automatic forfeitures—a harsh outcome that the Supreme Court 
of Ohio should seek to avoid. To do so, the Supreme Court of Ohio must reject 
the fee simple determinable approach to oil and gas leases and only allow 
forfeitures in extreme circumstances. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio will likely decide many cases in the near future 
on actions to invalidate held by production leases for gaps or missing 
production. The Court must adopt a bright-line rule to aid producers and 
landowners alike in their ability to determine the validity of oil and gas leases. 
A clear rule will provide much needed stability to Ohio’s oil and gas 
jurisprudence and create an environment that fosters investment and 
development in the oil and gas industry. To establish a clear rule, the court must 
reject the interpretation that an oil and gas lease with a standard habendum 
clause is strictly a fee simple determinable that ends by its own terms and adopt 
the approach taken by Oklahoma that avoids automatic terminations (or 
forfeitures) of leases. 
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